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Abstract 
The Boko Haram fundamentalist Islamic group is the 
first insurgent organization in Nigeria to be classified as 
a terrorist organization by the United States of America 
and its allies. Since 2009 the violence the group has 
unleashed on the Nigerian State is unprecedented in the 
history of insurgency in the country. Several studies have 
intellectualized the origin, motive and other activities of 
this infamous rebellious group. To advance the discourse 
on Boko Haram, this study examines the measures the 
Nigerian government has taken so far to address the 
menace posed by the Boko Haram insurgents. Using 
library research and interview methods, the findings of the 
study indicate that first, that the path Government should 
not follow is using the same methods it used to combat 
the Niger Delta militants to address the Boko Haram 
insurgents. Second, that peace negotiation is most unlikely 
to succeed with insurgents like those of Boko Haram 
with vile ideologies, whose core demands undermine 
democracy and good governance. Rather, it is more likely 
to succeed with insurgent groups pursuing legitimate 
political or economic based grievances that are capable 
of deepening democracy and good governance, that is, if 
Government accepts their core demands. Third, that peace 
negotiation is most unlikely to succeed with Boko Haram 
insurgents, since they do not have the capacity to lead a 
provincial government, after disavowing terrorism. This 
study strongly recommends that to checkmate the threat 
posed by Boko Haram insurgents, Government should 
treat them like terrorists rather than freedom fighters.
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INTRODUCTION
Apart from the challenges of poverty, sectarian, economic 
and political crises, and Niger Delta Militancy, Nigeria 
is currently facing a deeper and profound challenge of 
terrorism, especially in the North-Eastern region of the 
country. In the past two years, we have witnessed the 
vulnerability of the Nigerian state to terror, criminality 
and instability. The list of these disheartening phenomena 
includes, but is not limited to the bombing of several 
Churches, Mosques, Police Stations, Schools and Prisons 
in Bauchi, Bornu, Yobe and Adamawa states. Other parts 
of the country were not spared, as the sect-bombing 
activities were witnessed in the Federal capital territory, 
Abuja, Plateau, Kaduna and Kano states. The bombing 
of the United Nations office in Abuja is perhaps what the 
insurgents used to gain global recognition; as they are 
now listed amongst terrorist organizations by the United 
States and its allies, (for more details see The Economist, 
September 3, 2011).
Available statistics on the number of deaths and property 
lost to Boko Haram insurgency between 2002 and 2013 
to say the least is highly controversial. Our interviewee 
accounts claim that over 10,000 people (including women 
and children) have been killed and property worth over 100 
million dollars have been destroyed during the period under 
discussion (culled from interview of victims of Boko Haram 
attacks in Abuja, North Central, North East and North West 
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regions of the country). However, official reports put the 
death toll at 8,000 plus and property destroyed at 40 million 
dollars (culled from the interview of government officials 
in Abuja, Yobe, Kaduna, Plateau and Adamawa states).
Government’s response to the vicious attacks of Boko 
Haram has been a diverse mix of hope and trepidation. 
Hope lies in the fact that a state of emergency has been 
declared in (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states) inhabited 
by the insurgent group. Apart from that each time the 
Police and other security organizations responsible for 
internal security seem to be overwhelmed by the insurgents, 
the army is usually brought in to force them to retreat. 
Trepidation arises from the ability of the insurgents 
to regroup and strike even with the imposed state of 
emergency. The country’s vulnerability to incessant attacks 
from armed insurgents poses a great security challenge. 
According to the Minister of information, Labaran Maku, 
the country spends 27% of its budget on internal security 
alone. These are resources that could have been used to 
rehabilitate the country’s deplorable infrastructure (Review 
of 2013 by Channels Television).
Following the declaration of state of emergency in 
Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states, government troops 
have launched sustained offensive against the insurgent 
group, but this has not yielded the desired results. Most 
recently, the Air force base and Army post in Maiduguri 
were attacked by Boko Haram insurgents. According 
to an official report, “two helicopters and three out-of-
service planes were destroyed”. “Two military personnel 
were injured and 24 militants killed”. However, witnesses 
account culled from social media claimed that over 100 
persons, including civilians were killed.
In response to the attack, the Government imposed a 
24 hour curfew on the town. That the insurgent group is 
able to launch attacks on military installations and other 
public institutions even when the state of emergency is 
still in place, raises questions about the effectiveness of 
the government’s counter-offensive policy. This is what 
has instigated this investigation. This study examines 
Government’s counter-offensive policy to curb the threat 
posed by the Boko Haram insurgents, and why it has not 
yielded significant success. In doing so therefore, the 
study also illuminates the path the government should 
follow to checkmate the insurgency in a sustained manner.
1.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Using various variables, several scholars have tried to 
intellectualize what drives Boko Haram insurgents to 
carry out ferocious attacks against other people. Some 
have used religion to explain their act of violence, by 
simply arguing that there is something in their religion 
that influences them to undertake violence on a large 
scale. However, this argument is weak, because there is no 
significant relationship between being a Muslim and being 
a terrorist. Apart from that, the group attacks both Muslims 
and Christian (for a detailed discussion on this issue, see 
Christopher, 2011; Faruk, 2012; Gambell, 2011).
Some others have used political, sociological and 
psychological variables to explain their action (Herskovit, 
2010). The key point is that terrorism is not a mono-
causal phenomenon. Rather, it is a multi-causal one. 
For us, a multi-analytical approach provides powerful 
insights for understanding terrorism around the globe 
compared to the religion-focused theory that is mono-
causal in nature. For this study, we are more inclined to 
the multi-layered analysis using political, sociological 
and psychological variables to explain the activities of 
Boko Haram insurgents. From our investigation, there are 
sufficient empirical data which suggest that Boko Haram 
insurgents are driven by a combination of factors such as 
poverty, unemployment, bad governance and politics of 
North-South divide. Other intervening variables such as 
political rivalry amongst politicians in the Northern states 
and religion fuel their insurgent activities. In fact, every 
potential member of the group or sympathizer, have one 
vex-issue or the other against the government (for details 
of these vex-issues see Christopher, 2011). These are what 
predispose them to violence. Our investigation also reveals 
that apart from the elements above drugs also plays a vital 
role in the atrocities committed by Boko Haram members. 
One former member of the group informed us that before 
an operation, a particular kind of drug believed to be a pain 
killer is usually administered on everyone going for the 
operation. According to him, the drug prevents one from 
feeling pains even from bullets. Other kinds of drugs freely 
used by members include marijuana, cocaine and heroin. 
The Boko Haram convert seriously thinks that it is the 
drugs more than anything else that feeds their sadistic acts.
2 .   G O V E R N M E N T ’ S  C O U N T E R -
OFFENSIVE RESPONSE: THE STICK 
AND CARROT APPROACH
There is a common consensus in the Nigerian public 
sphere that Government’s response to Boko Haram 
insurgents has been reactionary rather than proactive. 
Those who share this sentiment argue that Government 
usually waits for the insurgents to launch attacks on 
Churches, Schools, Police Stations and other public 
institutions, before it reacts.
Between 2009 and 2013, the insurgents have killed 
more people than the AL Qaeda terrorist organization did 
in the World Trade Center in the United States of America 
in 2011, and are still killing, without the government 
being able to deflate them substantially. It is important 
to note that though it took the United States government 
more than 10 years to locate and eliminate Osama Bin 
Laden, the alleged leader of the Al Qaeda terrorist group; 
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it ensured that the group was unable to launch new 
attacks on its soil, while the hunt for Bin Laden lasted. In 
Nigeria, in spite of the state of emergency imposed by the 
government, the insurgents are still attacking both security 
agents and innocent citizens. What this simply signifies 
is that the government’s counter-offensive strategy is 
not yielding the right results. What are these strategies? 
Interestingly, no one other than President Goodluck 
Jonathan has been able to capture vividly Government’s 
response to the threat posed by the insurgent group on 
the country. In his response to former President Olusegun 
Obasanjo’s letter to him on the state of the nation titled, 
“Before it is too late” (2013), President Jonathan averred:
…At a stage, almost the entire North-East of Nigeria was 
under siege by insurgents. Bombings of churches and public 
buildings in the North and the federal capital became an almost 
weekly occurrence. Our entire national security apparatus 
seemed nonplussed and unable to come to grips with the new 
threat posed by the berthing of terrorism on our shores, but my 
administration has since brought that unacceptable situation 
under significant control. We have overhauled our entire 
national security architecture, improved intelligence gathering, 
training, funding, logistical support to our armed forces and 
security collaboration with friendly countries with very visible 
and positive results (Jonathan, 2013).
Other measures deduced from the President’s letter 
include poverty alleviation programmes, economic 
development, education and social reforms. The details 
are the provision of modern basic education schools for 
the Almajiri and the establishment of nine new federal 
universities in several Northern states. The government 
is also aggressively addressing the challenges of poverty 
through its youth empowerment programme like YouWin, 
and investing massively in infrastructure to promote 
economic development. At the height of the insurgency, 
Government set up an administrative panel to discuss 
with the insurgents, but they bluntly refused to meet with 
the government team. The sum of the administrative 
framework within much of the anti-insurgency policy, 
which has been implemented, especially within the 
context of Boko Haram are as follows:
• Troops have been reinforced
• The leadership of the movement has been targeted
• The International Joint Task Force (JTF) has been put 
in place
• The army has taken over the provision of internal 
security (declaration of state of emergence)
• A Curfew has been imposed
• GSM services have been banned and restored
• Civilian JTFs have been established
• Road blocks have been set up, and many other measures 
which the security operatives interviewed in the course of 
this study refused to disclose, for security reasons.
From our investigation, the most visible and positive 
result the above measures have yielded, is a significant 
reduction in the scope, but not in the impact of the 
insurgents’ operations. In terms of scope, the insurgents 
activities to a large extent, is now limited to the North-
Eastern region of the country. However, the impact of its 
operations is still being felt across the country. 
The reasons for this seeming failure of Government’s 
counter-offensive measures as the findings of this study 
show are: first, the federal government is using the same 
methods (force, administrative panel and negotiation) 
it used in addressing the Niger Delta militancy to 
tackle the Boko Haram insurgency. This is a wrong 
approach because both insurgent groups follow different 
trajectories. The Niger Delta militants had visible 
leadership and were ever ready to engage the government 
to drive home their demands. Anyone interested in their 
struggle could encounter them in both print and electronic 
media. For instance, their demands were well articulated 
in the Ogoni Bill of Rights and the Kaima Declaration. 
Their struggle became violent in reaction to Government’s 
use of violence to suppress their legitimate demands 
for a clean environment and a fair share of the proceeds 
from oil resources found on their ancestral land (for a 
detail discussion on this issue see Suberu, 1996; Akpan, 
2000; Ibeanu, 2000). However, like most struggles for 
material benefits, criminals infiltrated their ranks and 
introduced oil theft, kidnappings and assassinations. In 
addition, politicians began to use them to achieve personal 
goals. They set them up against their political opponents. 
Nevertheless, at least, we could separate the real militants 
from the criminals whenever the need arose.
On the contrary, the Boko Haram sect has become 
ubiquitous group after the death of Mohammed Yusuf, 
their founder. Not even Abubakar Shekaru, the newly 
acclaimed leader can claim effective control of the group. 
According to John (2013), the group does not have a 
clear structure or evident chain of command and has been 
called “diffuse”. Similarly, Walker (2013) describes the 
group as a “cell-like structure” facilitating factions and 
split. According to the Al Jazeera cable news network, the 
group is divided into three factions, with Ansaru being 
the most known faction. In addition, its demands are not 
well articulated. What most analysts claim, are that the 
group’s demands are at best unsubstantiated. For instance, 
the demand of Islamizing the country is not supported 
by empirical evidence, unlike the Taliban that establish 
provincial governments based on Islamic laws, whenever 
they take control of an area. This is reminiscent of the 
Afghanistan’s Taliban.
What is more worrisome is the fact that the group 
refused to negotiate with the government when it was 
offered the opportunity. This means that the group is not 
ready to dialogue with the government. They are ready to 
fight until they get what they want. What is it they want? 
Even Shekaru has not been able to state categorically 
what they want in his press and video releases. Renowned 
terrorist organizations like Al Qeada, Taliban and others 
always state their demands or motives in clear terms and 
never shy away from negotiation. Most of the times, It is 
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government that refuses to negotiate with them because 
their demands are not usually compatible with democratic 
tenets and good governance. 
In the case of Boko Haram, they are the ones who refuse 
to negotiate with the government. This gives credence 
to the conspiracy theory that the group is being used by 
aggrieved Northern politicians who promised to make the 
country ungovernable for President Jonathan, following 
the 2011 elections for usurping the second term of late 
President Umaru Yar Adua which they believe is meant for 
Northerners. This is also in a bid to ensure that he does not 
win a second term if he decides to contest in 2015. 
In Nigerian politics, personal interest overrides 
both party and national interests. From these theorists 
also comes the argument that the insurgents’ attack on 
Churches and Schools was intended to spark reprisals 
by Christians against Muslims, in line with the argument 
of making the country ungovernable for the President. 
Several other theories abound for and against the motive 
behind the insurgency, but they are simply academic 
conjectures that need empirical substantiation.
The second finding of the study indicates that the 
government seems to be treating the insurgent group like 
freedom fighters with legitimate demands, rather than 
as a terrorist group. This explains why the government 
wants to negotiate with them. However, this approach 
has also failed to yield any significant result because as 
Niaz Murtaza (2013) rightly points out, historically, peace 
negotiations succeed more easily with militant groups 
pursuing legitimate identity-based grievances. It is easier 
for government to accept their core demand, which actually 
strengthens democracy and good governance. From every 
indication, the demands of the Boko Haram insurgent 
group are not legitimate and compatible with the country’s 
constitution. This in part explains why they have refused 
to negotiate with the government. Therefore, Government 
should stop treating them like freedom fighters. 
The third finding shows that there are individuals 
within and outside the government that are benefitting 
from the insurgency through contracts and supplies to 
government. These people encourage the government 
to treat the insurgents like freedom fighters rather 
than terrorists, so that they can continue to benefit 
from policies that prolong the insurgency rather than 
checkmate it. Closely following this, in the fight 
against the insurgents, is the role of top Military, Police 
and other security organizations. There is significant 
evidence in the data collected for this study which 
indicates the complicity of the Military, Police and other 
security agencies in the fight against the insurgents. Our 
findings on this issue collaborates the submission of 
military experts who commented on Channels television 
on the recent attacks on the Air force base in Maiduguri 
where several people were killed, and two helicopters 
and three out-of-service planes were destroyed. That 
the insurgents were able to launch attacks on military 
installations even when the state of emergency imposed 
by the government was still in place raises serious 
questions of complicity within the rank and file of the 
military and other security organizations. 
In the light of the above, it is our argument that Boko 
Haram is not the kind of group Government should use 
administrative measures to tackle. It is also not the kind 
that should be granted amnesty like some people have 
suggested. Empirical evidence abound in other climes 
such as Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Pakistan of terrorist 
group that uses similar tactics like the Boko Haram and 
how they are treated by their respective governments. 
3.  THE WAY FORWARD
The prognoses of action suggested by the findings of 
this study are as follows: First, government at all levels 
should begin to treat Boko Haram like a terrorist group 
rather than freedom fighters, especially after the rejection 
of the government’s olive branch. Freedom fighters are 
insurgents whose core demands are capable of addressing 
social, political and economic injustices. In this case, 
if Government accepts their demands, democracy is 
enhanced and good governance is promoted.
Second, the federal government should undertake 
intensive policing of the country’s border, especially the 
Nigeria-Chad and Nigeria-Cameroon borders in the North-
Eastern region of the country. This measure will prevent 
the insurgents and their foreign supporters from entering 
or establishing camps within the country’s borders.
Third, the saboteurs in the military and other security 
organizations should be identified and prosecuted. 
Thereafter, Government should ensure that the insurgents 
do not carry out more attacks on its shores by taking the 
fight to the insurgents, like the American government 
did with the Al Qaeda network. To achieve this, the 
government should enter into bilateral agreements with 
the governments of Chad and Cameroon on how to 
address the insurgency. The multi-national task force 
should be expanded and strengthened to cover the entire 
border areas between Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon.
Fourth, the federal government should enlist the 
support of citizens in the fight against the insurgents by 
compensating anyone who gives reasonable information 
to security organizations about the members of the 
group. Government should also ensure that such persons 
are protected against insurgent’s reprisal attacks. The 
establishment of the 7 Division of the Nigerian army in 
Maiduguri is a welcome development.
CONCLUSION
This study discussed the inherent weaknesses in the 
Government’s counter-offensive policy to the threat posed 
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by the Boko Haram insurgents to the Nigerian state. 
Available evidence shows that the counter-terrorist policy 
of the government is defective. The study highlighted 
the measures the government should undertake to curb 
the menace of the insurgents such as policing its borders 
in the North Eastern region effectively, collaborating 
with countries that it shares borders with, equipping her 
security organizations and enlisting the support of her 
citizens in the fight against the insurgents, amongst others. 
This study concludes that the more effective way of 
checkmating the threat posed by Boko Haram insurgents 
to the Nigerian state is for the government to treat the 
insurgents like terrorists rather than freedom fighters.
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